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ABSTRACT
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)’s whistleblower
reward program has received much attention with its recent expansion in
regards to reward amounts and whistleblowing tips. Opinions have been
divided over whether whistleblower rewards, along with whistleblower
protection laws, align with potential whistleblowers’ decision-making, and
this disagreement has arisen from our insufficient understanding of the
relative importance of the factors affecting whistleblowers’ decisions. The
author conducted a survey of U.S. employees using a securities fraud
scenario and then used a path analysis to estimate the relative impacts of the
factors affecting employees’ internal and external whistleblowing intentions.
The results revealed that, given the conditions assumed in the scenario, there
were two main factors affecting internal whistleblowing intention:
organizational commitment had a positive impact, and the fear of retaliation
had a negative impact. In comparison, there were also two main factors
affecting external whistleblowing intention: moral intensity and reward-
driven motivation, both of which had positive impacts. The effect sizes of
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these impacts on internal and external whistleblowing intentions fell within
the small-to-medium range according to conventional statistical criteria.
These results implied that both monetary and non-monetary motivations can
be enhanced by whistleblower policies. Whistleblower protection and
timely responses by companies and the SEC are critical in improving the
balance of costs and benefits to individuals resulting from internal and
external whistleblowing, and monetary rewards are an effective policy tool
to encourage external whistleblowing.
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INTRODUCTION
Why do employees blow the whistle on corporate crimes? What factors
encourage and discourage whistleblowing, and how important is each factor?
Understanding these questions is important in many jurisdictions because
authorities have increasingly relied on whistleblowers to detect corporate
crimes; many countries have established whistleblower protection laws, and
some countries have even created monetary reward programs for
whistleblowers. In order to design better whistleblower-related laws,
policymakers need to comprehend the manner of decision-making by
potential whistleblowers. This Article analyzes the determinants of
employees’ whistleblowing intention by providing empirical evidence from
a survey of employees in the United States, a leading country in the use of
whistleblowing tips to detect corporate crimes.
In every jurisdiction, detecting corporate crime is extremely difficult
because of information asymmetry between companies and authorities about
companies’ business activities. The budget and resources of enforcement
agencies are limited, so enforcement agencies cannot solve this information
asymmetry by themselves. Under such circumstances, information
asymmetry can be eased by whistleblowers—those who disclose illegal
practices within a corporation to persons or organizations that may be able
to take effective actions. Employees’ whistleblowing tips may not only help
conserve authorities’ limited resources but also enable the faster detection of
crimes. Therefore, how society should utilize the power of whistleblowers
has been a matter of policy interest. Yet, prior literature has not fully
analyzed the fundamental question of what determines employees’
whistleblowing intention.
In terms of economics, employees’ decisions on whether to blow the
whistle depend on the personal benefits and costs resulting from their
whistleblowing.
1
If the benefits exceed the costs, then employees will blow
the whistle. The benefits from whistleblowing include non-monetary and
monetary ones. Some may engage in whistleblowing because they receive a
positive utility relating to the feeling of virtue from preventing harm to
society. Others may report crimes because they value the monetary rewards
offered by authorities. Similarly, the costs from whistleblowing take various
1. See, e.g., Yehonatan Givati, A Theory of Whistleblower Rewards, 45 J. LEGAL STUD.
43 (2016) (discussing the relationship between the personal benefits and costs of external
whistleblowing); Masaki Iwasaki, Effects of External Whistleblower Rewards on Internal
Reporting (Harvard John M. Olin Fellow’s Discussion Paper Series, No. 76, 2018), http://w
ww.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/fellows_papers/pdf/Iwasaki_76.pdf [https://perm
a.cc/YF5F-24QZ] (explaining the personal benefits and costs of internal reporting and
external whistleblowing).
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forms. Some may suffer interference with their promotions from their
supervisors and managers. Others may be forced to leave their company and
look for a new job.
Corresponding to this cost–benefit structure, whistleblower-related
legislation can be classified into two forms: laws that decrease employees’
costs from whistleblowing and laws that increase their benefits from
whistleblowing. The first type, which reduces workers’ costs from reporting,
is based on the fact that employees often suffer retaliation from the
wrongdoers. As explained in Section I.A, over the past three decades, many
jurisdictions have established whistleblower protection laws. Under these
laws, employees are legally protected from retaliation if their whistleblowing
satisfies certain requirements of the law. The degree of effectiveness of
whistleblower protection laws is still an empirical question, but the need for
the protection of whistleblowers is widely accepted in many jurisdictions.
The second type, which increases workers’ benefits from reporting,
offers monetary rewards for employees’ whistleblowing to enforcement
agencies. Several countries, such as the United States, Canada, and South
Korea, have introduced whistleblower reward programs, but the number of
countries with whistleblower rewards is still small relative to the number of
countries with whistleblower protection laws.
2
The United States has
proactively tried to gain whistleblowers’ information by creating
whistleblower reward programs, such as those of the False Claims Act,
Internal Revenue Service, Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and
Commodity Futures Trading Commission.
Among these programs in the United States, the most booming one is
the SEC whistleblower reward program under the Dodd–Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd–Frank Act), which was
established in 2011.
3
This program offers monetary rewards for
whistleblowing on violations of federal securities laws. Whistleblowers can
receive a monetary reward when their information is original, of good
quality, and leads to an enforcement action in which sanctions of more than
$1,000,000 are ordered.
4
Whistleblower rewards range from 10% to 30% of
the money collected. In FY 2018, the SEC awarded approximately $168
million to 13 individuals; thus, the average amount of rewards is nearly $13
million.
5
2. CAITLINMASLEN, WHISTLEBLOWERREWARDPROGRAMMES 3 (2018), https://knowled
gehub.transparency.org/assets/uploads/helpdesk/Whistleblower-Reward-Programmes-2018.
pdf [https://perma.cc/P7DY-LDSB].
3. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2012).
5. SEC, WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM: 2018 ANNUALREPORT TOCONGRESS 1 (2018), htt
ps://www.sec.gov/sec-2018-annual-report-whistleblower-program.pdf [https://perma.cc/A6
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Opinions are divided over whether whistleblower rewards, along with
whistleblower protection laws, align with potential whistleblowers’
decision-making. For example, some have argued that monetary rewards do
not significantly encourage external whistleblowing,
6
but others have
suggested that they do.
7
One of the reasons for these mixed conclusions is
that each opinion’s assumptions on whistleblowers’ motivations are
sometimes significantly different from one another. As whistleblower-
related data are limited because of the need to protect whistleblowers’
personal information, empirical analyses on whistleblowing are difficult to
conduct, leading to the aforementioned discrepancy.
That being said, a certain consensus exists on what factors affect
employees’ whistleblowing decisions. For example, prior literature has
revealed that many factors, such as moral intensity, organizational
commitment, fear of retaliation, and reward-driven motivation, affect
employees’ reporting decisions. What has been missing so far is a full
analysis of the sizes—especially the relative sizes—of these effects when
these factors are considered jointly, not separately. Without understanding
this, determining whether and how much whistleblower rewards, as well as
protection laws, help in whistleblowers’ decision-making is difficult.
Given all the arguments above, this Article analyzes the competing
causes behind employees’ whistleblowing intention by using a path analysis,
which is a statistical method used to analyze the relative strengths of causal
relationships among multiple variables. The author conducted a survey of
U.S. employees by using a hypothetical scenario in which the participants
were asked how they would behave if they found a violation of federal
securities law in their workplace. Based on the answers from the
participants, a path analysis was conducted.
The results revealed that, given the certain conditions assumed in the
scenario, internal whistleblowing intention was influenced by two main
factors: organizational commitment had a positive impact, and the fear of
R9-ACA2].
6. See, e.g., Matt A. Vega, Beyond Incentives: Making CorporateWhistleblowingMoral
in the New Era of Dodd-Frank Act “Bounty Hunting,” 45 CONN. L. REV. 483 (2012) (arguing
that financial incentives alone are insufficient to promote external whistleblowing); BANK OF
ENG., FINANCIAL INCENTIVES FORWHISTLEBLOWERS (2014), https://www.fca.org.uk/publicat
ion/financial-incentives-for-whistleblowers.pdf [https://perma.cc/5YY6-9TAW] (contending
that financial incentives would not meaningfully increase the number of whistleblowing
disclosures).
7. See, e.g., Sarah L. Reid & Serena B. David, The Evolution of the SECWhistleblower:
From Sarbanes–Oxley to Dodd–Frank, 129 BANKING L.J. 907 (2012) (arguing that
whistleblowing will become more common because of new financial incentives); Philip G.
Berger & Heemin Lee, Do Corporate Whistleblower Laws Deter Accounting Fraud? (2019),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3059231 [https://perma.cc/CF8L-PDYZ] (finding that the Dodd-
Frank whistleblowing laws have reduced accounting fraud).
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retaliation had a negative impact. In comparison, external whistleblowing
intention was also influenced by two main factors: moral intensity and
reward-driven motivation, both of which had positive impacts. The effect
sizes of these impacts on internal and external whistleblowing intentions fell
within the small-to-medium range according to conventional statistical
criteria. These results implied that both monetary and non-monetary
motivations are crucial in whistleblowers’ decisions.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I explains whistleblower
legislation and presents some facts about whistleblowers, and Part II
provides the theoretical background of employees’ decisions on
whistleblowing and presents the hypotheses. Part III explains the research
method, and Part IV presents the results of the path analysis. Part V provides
the interpretations and policy implications of the results, and Part VI
concludes the Article.
I. WHISTLEBLOWER LAWS AND FACTS
A. International Perspectives
In many jurisdictions, enforcement agencies can reveal only a small
portion of corporate crimes by themselves, but employees can reveal a larger
portion of crimes. For example, Dyck et al. found that, for corporate frauds,
the SEC detected only 7% of a sample of 216 cases, but employees detected
17% of the cases.
8
The fact that whistleblowers reveal a significant portion
of corporate crimes means that they can be a threat to wrongdoers. Indeed,
whistleblowers frequently suffer retaliation from wrongdoers. One survey
in the United States reported that 22% of sample employees who reported
misconduct experienced some form of retaliation.
9
Another survey in the
United Kingdom reported that 78% of sample whistleblowers experienced
retaliation.
10
Given these backgrounds, multilateral anti-corruption treaties require
their member countries to provide appropriate protections for whistleblowers
on corruption, which includes the protection of whistleblowers in the private
sector. For example, under treaties such as the United Nations Convention
Against Corruption and the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption,
8. Alexander Dyck, Adair Morse & Luigi Zingales, Who Blows the Whistle on
Corporate Fraud?, 65 J. FIN. 2213, 2214 (2010).
9. ETHICSRES. CTR., 2011 NATIONALBUSINESS ETHICS SURVEY 12 (2012).
10. ALL PARTY PARLIAMENTARY GRP. ON WHISTLEBLOWING, WHISTLEBLOWING: THE
PERSONAL COST OF DOING THE RIGHT THING AND THE COST TO SOCIETY OF IGNORING IT 20
(2019), https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/88d04c_9754e54bc641443db902cd963687cb55.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WQ5M-P7SR].
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countries need to consider incorporating into their domestic legal systems
protections for those who report corruption cases to authorities in good
faith.
11
Moreover, international soft laws present guidelines on
whistleblower protection. For instance, the Committee of Ministers of the
Council of Europe adopted Recommendation CM/Rec(2014)7, which
describes guiding principles for domestic legislation on protecting
whistleblowers in both private and public sectors.
12
Furthermore, the OECD
has set out international standards for whistleblower protection by adopting
recommendations such as the Good Practice Guidance on Internal Controls,
Ethics and Compliance in 2010
13
and the Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises in 2011.
14
At the domestic law level, many countries have enacted some form of
whistleblower legislation over the past three decades. Among them, some
countries, such as Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, the
Slovak Republic, South Africa, and the United Kingdom have
comprehensive whistleblower protection laws that are applied to employees
in both private and public sectors.
15
Other countries have whistleblower laws
that are applied to certain sectors or industries. A comprehensive
whistleblower law tends to provide stronger protection for whistleblowers
than a sectoral whistleblower law.
16
B. U.S. Whistleblower Legislation
In the Unites States, federal and state laws provide protection for
whistleblowers in the private and public sectors. As for corporate crimes in
the private sector, there is no comprehensive federal law that is applied to
whistleblowers in the all industries, but several statues protect
whistleblowers in certain industries. Examples of these federal statutes
include the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX Act),
17
the Food and Drug
11. United Nations Convention Against Corruption, art. 33, Oct. 31, 2003, 2349 U.N.T.S.
41; Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, art. III, Mar. 29, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 724.
12. COUNCIL OF EUR., PROTECTION OF WHISTLEBLOWERS: RECOMMENDATION
CM/REC(2014)7ANDEXPLANATORYMEMORANDUM (2014), https://rm.coe.int/16807096c7 [h
ttps://perma.cc/4Q3H-58YJ].
13. OECD, GOOD PRACTICE GUIDANCE ON INTERNAL CONTROLS, ETHICS, AND
COMPLIANCE, ANNEX II (2010), https://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/44884389.pdf [https:/
/perma.cc/5DLY-PC75].
14. OECD, OECDGUIDELINES FORMULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 23 (2011), https://ww
w.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/48004323.pdf [https://perma.cc/8QTA-WYFB].
15. See OECD, COMMITTING TO EFFECTIVEWHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION 22 (2016), htt
ps://www.oecd.org/corporate/committing-to-effective-whistleblower-protection-978926425
2639-en.htm [https://perma.cc/D8TT-ZXRH].
16. Id.
17. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2018).
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Administration Food Safety Modernization Act,
18
and environmental laws
such as the Clean Water Act
19
and the Toxic Substances Control Act.
20
In the case of whistleblowers on violations of federal securities laws,
the SOX Act and the Dodd-Frank Act provide protection for whistleblowers.
Both laws prohibit employers from retaliating against whistleblowers;
prohibited acts include discharge, demotion, suspension, threats, and
harassment.
21
In the SOX Act, whistleblowers who suffered retaliation may
receive back pay and special damages, such as emotional distress and
reputational damages.
22
The statute of limitations is 180 days after a
whistleblower experienced or became aware of a retaliation.
23
In
comparison, in the Dodd-Frank Act, whistleblowers who suffered retaliation
may receive double back pay but no special damages.
24
The statute of
limitations is 6 years after a whistleblower experienced a retaliation or 3
years after the whistleblower discovered or should have discovered the facts
that support his or her claim, but no more than 10 years after the retaliation.
25
The SEC had interpreted that, under the Dodd-Frank Act,
whistleblowers are protected even if they report possible violations only
internally, such as to an internal compliance officer.
26
However, in 2018, the
Supreme Court held in Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers that employees
must report possible violations to the SEC to qualify for protection from
retaliation under the Dodd-Frank Act.
27
Thus, whistleblower protection
under the Dodd-Frank Act is not applied to whistleblowers who report only
internally. Although whistleblowers who report only internally are still
protected by other laws, such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the level
of protection is lower for whistleblowers who do not report violations to the
SEC. In order to fix the gap in protection, in July 2019, the House of
Representatives passed the Whistleblower Protection Reform Act of 2019,
and in September 2019, a bipartisan group in the Senate introduced the
Whistleblower Programs Improvement Act; both bills aim to provide more
protections for internal reporting.
28
18. 21 U.S.C. § 399d (2018).
19. 33 U.S.C. § 1367 (2018).
20. 15 U.S.C. § 2622 (2018).
21. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2018); 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a) (2018).
22. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(c) (2018).
23. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(D) (2018).
24. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(C) (2018).
25. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(B)(iii) (2018).
26. SEC, supra note 5, at 18.
27. 138 S. Ct. 767, 772–73 (2018).
28. Antuan Johnson, Bill Would Bridge Digital Realty Whistleblower Protection Gap,
LAW 360 (Nov. 13, 2019), https://www.law360.com/articles/1217307/bill-would-bridge-digi
tal-realty-whistleblower-protection-gap [https://perma.cc/FGA8-3CXQ].
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In addition to the aforementioned protections, whistleblowers on
violations of federal securities laws may also receive monetary rewards. In
2011, as explained in the Introduction, the SEC introduced the whistleblower
reward program under the Dodd-Frank Act. Since the establishment of this
program in 2011, the SEC has awarded over $326 million to 59
whistleblowers.
29
Because the SEC receives numerous tips, the probability
of receiving a reward based on a simple calculation is very low. For
example, the SEC received has received over 28,000 whistleblower tips since
2011;
30
although the quality of information would significantly vary case by
case, uncertainty will be always a part of the whistleblowing process.
Regarding the types of contributions by whistleblowers, approximately
67% of whistleblowers received rewards because their information enabled
the SEC to commence an investigation; approximately 33% of
whistleblowers received rewards because their information helped an
ongoing investigation.
31
As for the types of crimes reported by
whistleblowers, offering fraud (20%), corporate disclosures and financials
(19%), and manipulation (12%) were the most common in FY 2018.
32
Approximately 83% of reward recipients who were current or former
employees first reported potential violations internally or understood that
their supervisor or compliance department knew of the issues before
reporting to the SEC.
33
II. THEORETICALBACKGROUND ANDHYPOTHESES
This Part first elaborates on the notion of whistleblowing intention and
then identifies its causes by looking at prior literature in economics and other
fields. All of the causes are reframed in an economic analysis in which the
benefits and costs to individuals are of significance. As premises for the
estimation of the strengths of competing causes, hypotheses are made on
whether each cause positively or negatively affects whistleblowing intention.
Figure 1 presents the model of the Article, showing the relationships
between whistleblowing intention and the factors affecting it, and whether
each factor has a positive or negative impact on whistleblowing intention.
As explained below, whistleblowing intention consists of internal and
external whistleblowing intentions, and these intentions are influenced by
moral intensity, organizational commitment, fear of retaliation, and reward-
driven motivation.
29. SEC, supra note 5, at 1.
30. Id. at 20.
31. Id. at 16.
32. Id. at 21.
33. Id. at 17.
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B. Moral Intensity
Numerous studies in psychology and business ethics have revealed that
employees’ whistleblowing intention is influenced by moral intensity,
35
which is one’s evaluation of the degree of an act’s immorality. Put
differently, moral intensity measures to what extent an act is morally
unacceptable. In the context of corporate crime, the immorality of an act is
evaluated based on factors such as one’s evaluation of the degree of harm
caused by the crime and the evaluation of the degree to which society expects
one to take actions to prevent the crime. Moral intensity is an issue-
contingent concept, and thus, in the case of corporate crime, the level of
moral intensity depends on conditions such as the types of crime and the
victim of the crime.
In terms of economics, the notion of moral intensity is associated with
the non-pecuniary benefits or costs of whistleblowing. When employees
report a crime internally, externally or both, their reports can usually prevent
or mitigate the social harm of the crime if their reports are appropriately
addressed in a timely way. If one fails to prevent corporate crimes when
they can do so, this would hurt social welfare. The individual may feel guilt
and suffer disutility from the fact that the harm was not prevented or that the
individual does not behave in a way society expects him or her to.
(Equivalently, if one prevents corporate crimes when he or she can, this
would maintain social welfare, and the individual may feel virtue and receive
a positive utility.) Moreover, their disutility may increase if the harm
becomes larger. Prior literature has studied this assumption.
36
Indeed, there
is a study that conducted interviews with whistleblowers who filed U.S.
federal qui tam lawsuits under the False Claims Act; the study revealed that
these whistleblowers’ primary motivation was associated with the feelings
of guilt or virtue related to social welfare.
37
If the evaluated degree of immorality of a violation becomes larger, the
35. See, e.g., Thomas M. Jones, Ethical Decision Making by Individuals in
Organizations: An Issue-Contingent Model, 16 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 366 (1991); Ming Singer,
Sarah Mitchell & Julie Turner, Consideration of Moral Intensity in Ethicality Judgments: Its
Relationship with Whistle-blowing and Need-for-Cognition, 17 J. BUS. ETHICS 527 (1998).
36. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Moral Rules, the Moral Sentiments, and
Behavior: Toward a Theory of an Optimal Moral System, 115 J. POL. ECON. 494 (2007)
(analyzing howmoral sanctions and rewards should be used to influence individual behavior);
Steven Shavell, When Is Compliance with the Law Socially Desirable?, 41 J. LEGAL STUD. 1
(2012) (evaluating the circumstances in which an individual would desire to adhere to the law
in order to promote social welfare).
37. Aaron S. Kesselheim, David M. Studdert & Michelle M. Mello, Whistle-Blowers’
Experiences in Fraud Litigation Against Pharmaceutical Companies, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1832, 1834 (2010).
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degree of disutility one suffers when not reporting would increase; thus, both
internal and external whistleblowing would be more likely to occur as long
as they are effective measures for preventing or mitigating harm. In the case
of the United States, since the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
U.S. corporations seem to have established effective internal reporting and
compliance systems to a certain degree, and thus, the internal reporting
channel, as well as the external one, can be trusted by employees, at least to
some extent. Therefore, moral intensity should positively affect both internal
and external whistleblowing intentions.
The arguments above yield the following hypothesis:
HYPOTHESIS 1: Moral intensity positively affects internal
whistleblowing intention.
HYPOTHESIS 2: Moral intensity positively affects external
whistleblowing intention.
C. Organizational Commitment
Another factor that prior literature has identified is organizational
commitment, which is defined as the degree of one’s loyalty to a company.
38
The reasons for employee loyalty tend to differ from person to person: some
may expect economic benefits, such as promotions and bonuses, and others
may conform to social norms that expect employees’ loyalty to their
company.
If the degree of one’s loyalty increases, with all other conditions held
constant, this individual would be more likely to report an offense internally.
Keeping silent on the issue may damage the company’s value and reputation.
Although illegal profits from the crime may boost the company’s value in
the short term if the crime is not detected, having the company take actions
to prevent the crime generally helps the company maintain its value and
reputation in the long term.
By contrast, the impact of organizational commitment on external
whistleblowing intention is theoretically difficult to predict. A possible
explanation would be that if an individual’s loyalty increases, this person
would be less likely to report an offense externally while expecting the
company to solve the issue by itself without an enforcement agency’s
38. See, e.g., Marcia P. Miceli, Janet P. Near & Charles R. Schwenk, Who Blows the
Whistle and Why?, 45 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 113 (1991) (investigating the relationship
between organizational commitment and actual whistleblowing behavior); Eileen Z. Taylor
& Mary B. Curtis, An Examination of the Layers of Workplace Influences in Ethical
Judgments: Whistleblowing Likelihood and Perseverance in Public Accounting, 93 J. BUS.
ETHICS 21 (2010) (examining how organizational commitment influences the likelihood of
whistleblowing using hypothetical scenarios).
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intervention. Society may perceive employees’ external reporting as a
betrayal of their companies, and this type of social norm may influence
employees’ decisions. If this is not the case, organizational commitment
may not be significantly associated with external whistleblowing intention.
These considerations lead to the following hypotheses:
HYPOTHESIS 3: Organizational commitment positively affects
internal whistleblowing intention.
HYPOTHESIS 4: Organizational commitment negatively affects
external whistleblowing intention.
D. Fear of Retaliation
The next important factor is the fear of retaliation, which discourages
employees’ willingness to blow the whistle.
39
Although employees are
protected by whistleblower protection laws, in many jurisdictions, the degree
of protection is far from sufficient, and employees still often suffer from
various forms of retaliation, such as interference with promotions and
dismissal.
One of the reasons for the insufficient protection of whistleblowers is
that the applicable scope of whistleblower protection laws often differs
between reporting channels. In the case of federal securities violations in the
United States, as explained in Section I.B, the level of protection is currently
lower for whistleblowers who report only internally than for those who
report both internally and externally or only externally, although this gap is
likely to be fixed.
Another reason for the insufficient protection of whistleblowers is that
regardless of the reporting channels, there is a risk that a whistleblower’s
identity may not be adequately protected. The recipients of internal and
external reports, such as companies’ internal compliance departments and
enforcement agencies, may disclose whistleblowers’ identities, intentionally
or not. Maintaining the confidentiality of whistleblowers is a difficult task,
and if the identities of whistleblowers are not fully protected, there is always
a risk of retaliation.
As these arguments show, employees face the risk of retaliation,
although such a risk may differ between the two types of reporting channels.
The risk of retaliation increases the costs employees suffer from
39. See, e.g., Jessica R. Mesmer-Magnus & ChockalingamViswesvaran,Whistleblowing
in Organizations: An Examination of Correlates of Whistleblowing Intentions, Actions, and
Retaliation, 62 J. BUS. ETHICS 277, 281 (2005) (describing the relationship between
whistleblowing and retaliation); Yoon Jik Cho & Hyun Jin Song, Determinants of
Whistleblowing Within Government Agencies, 44 PUBLIC PERSONNEL MGMT. 450 (2015)
(discussing the factors that influence whistleblowing behavior, including retaliation).
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whistleblowing, and the evaluation of these costs changes from person to
person. The stronger the fear of retaliation is, the less likely internal and
external whistleblowing will occur.
From these arguments, the following hypotheses are proposed:
HYPOTHESIS 5: The fear of retaliation negatively affects internal
whistleblowing intention.
HYPOTHESIS 6: The fear of retaliation negatively affects external
whistleblowing intention.
E. Reward-Driven Motivation
Finally, reward-driven motivation, or the degree to which one values
monetary rewards in external whistleblowing, has been identified as a factor
affecting external whistleblowing intention.
40
Monetary rewards for external
whistleblowing increase the benefits gained from external whistleblowing
for employees, and to what extent this leads to an increase in whistleblowing
intention varies from person to person. If the degree to which an individual
values monetary rewards increases, this person would be more likely to
report externally given the existence of monetary rewards.
By contrast, the effect of reward-driven motivation on internal
whistleblowing intention has not yet been fully analyzed. A plausible
explanation here would be that if the degree to which an individual values
monetary reward increases, this person would be less likely to report
internally, assuming that companies fail to offer monetary rewards for
internal whistleblowing.
41
These considerations yield the following hypotheses:
HYPOTHESIS 7: Reward-driven motivation negatively affects
internal whistleblowing intention.
HYPOTHESIS 8: Reward-driven motivation positively affects
external whistleblowing intention.
40. ETHICSRES. CTR., INSIDE THEMIND OF AWHISTLEBLOWER 16 (2012), https://www.et
hics.org/mdocs-posts/erc-nbes-inside-the-mind-of-a-whistleblower/ [https://perma.cc/C3QN
-VLWA]; see also Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, The Incentives Matrix: The Comparative
Effectiveness of Rewards, Liabilities, Duties, and Protections for Reporting Illegality, 88 TEX.
L. REV. 1151 (2010) (discussing how monetary rewards affect whistleblowing behavior).
41. This does not mean that the monetary rewards for external whistleblowing
discourages internal whistleblowing. The notion of reward-drivenmotivationmerely captures
to what extent money is important for an individual’s reporting decision. Internal
whistleblowing intention may be increased by the introduction of monetary rewards for
external whistleblowing. Iwasaki, supra note 1.
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III. METHOD
A. Statistical Method
The author used a path analysis; this is an extension of a multiple
regression, which allows for multiple dependent variables—variables whose
variations are to be explained. As explained in Part II, the model of this
Article has two dependent variables (i.e., internal and external
whistleblowing intentions), and thus, the use of a path analysis is appropriate
and reasonable.
42
The purpose of a path analysis is not to prove causal relationships, but
rather to estimate the relative strengths of causal relationships on the
assumption that causal relationships are correctly specified in a model. Even
if causal relationships are statistically significant and have certain strengths,
this does not mean that these causal relationships have been proved. Rather,
it means that the model has not been disproved and has been made tentatively
more plausible.
43
This Article adds new evidence to the stock of empirical
findings that previous studies have revealed.
In addition to the aforementioned two dependent variables, the model
of this Article has four independent variables—variables that explain the
variations of the dependent variables and are not affected by other variables
in the model: moral intensity, organizational commitment, fear of retaliation,
and reward-driven motivation.
The path analysis estimated the relative strengths of the causal
relationships that are described in the diagram of Figure 1, which is the path
diagram.
B. Data
The author conducted a questionnaire survey using Amazon
Mechanical Turk (MTurk), a crowdsourcing online platform. Social
scientists, such as psychologists and behavioral economists, have recently
used this service to recruit participants for their studies. Several studies have
confirmed that the data collected fromMTurk are at least as reliable as those
42. Structural equation modeling (SEM) is also a possible approach that could be used.
However, the measurement items for the independent variables in this Article have been used
in prior literature; the interest of the Article lies in a structural model rather than a
measurement model. Moreover, SEM needs a large sample size. For this reason, path
analysis was chosen.
43. See Kenneth A. Bollen & Judea Pearl, Eight Myths About Causality and Structural
Equation Models, in HANDBOOK OF CAUSAL ANALYSIS FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH 301 (Stephen
L. Morgan ed., 2013) for similar arguments.
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from traditional collection methods, such as recruiting college students.
44
The author recruited people located in the United States who worked or
had worked as waged employees in organizations at the time of the survey,
February 2016. The participants were paid 0.5 U.S. dollars for their
participation. The collected sample was 200.
Table 1 summarizes the participants’ demographic data: the proportion
of female participants was 43%; the mean age was 35 years; the proportion
of participants who had a bachelor’s degree or higher was 58.5%; the
proportion of participants who worked or had worked in publicly listed
corporations was 74%; the proportion of participants whose household
income was $50,000 or higher was 46%; and 7.5% had personal experience
with whistleblowing or knew people who had actually blown the whistle.
Table 1: Demographic Data
Gender Women 43%, Men 57%
Mean Age 35 years
B.A. or Higher Education 58.5%
Working Experience in Public Companies 74%
Household Income $50,000 or Higher 46%
Whistleblowing Experience
(Own or Acquaintance’s)
7.5%
C. Procedure
The participants were first asked to answer questions that measured
their organizational commitment about the organization for which they were
working or the last organization for which they had worked. Then, they were
presented with a hypothetical scenario in which they were assumed to be an
assistant manager in a general accounting department of a company selling
information technology services.
45
44. See, e.g., Michael Buhrmester, Tracy Kwang & Samuel D. Gosling, Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk: A New Source of Inexpensive, Yet High-Quality, Data?, 6 PERSP. ON
PSYCHOL. SCI. 3 (2011).
45. For whistleblowing studies using a hypothetical scenario, see, for example, Ching-
Pu Chen & Chih-Tsung Lai, To Blow or Not to Blow the Whistle: The Effects of Potential
Harm, Social Pressure and Organisational Commitment on Whistleblowing Intention and
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In the scenario, a supervisor had begun to manipulate the company’s
financial documents to overstate its profits. After reading the scenario, the
participants were asked to answer questions about how they would think and
behave in this situation. Their possible options were reporting the issue to a
whistleblower hotline inside the company, reporting the issue to the SEC,
keeping silent, leaving the company, and other options that they freely
specified. If they chose to report the issue to the SEC, they were assumed to
receive a monetary reward of $10,000,000 with a probability of 10% from
the SEC whistleblower reward program under the Dodd-Frank Act.
The probability of leaking of personal information and subsequent
retaliation (interference with promotion) by the supervisor was assumed to
be 50% in the case of internal reporting and 25% in the case of external
reporting. The actual percentage of whistleblowers who experienced
retaliation varies from 20% to 70%, depending on the data sources
analyzed.
46
The probabilities assumed in the scenario fell within this range.
Because reliable data on the risk of retaliation for each channel were not
available, the author made assumptions based on the fact that the quality of
internal reporting systems varies from company to company and that the risk
of personal information leakage would be generally greater in internal
reporting than in external reporting.
47
The scenario reduced the probability
of retaliation for external whistleblowing to half of the probability for
internal whistleblowing.
The Appendix of this Article includes the hypothetical scenario and
questionnaire items. To build a realistic whistleblowing scenario, the author
Behaviour, 23 BUS. ETHICS: EUROPEANREV. 327 (2014). They used a scenario of food safety
violation to analyze the impacts of moral intensity and organizational commitment on
whistleblowing intention. The present study uses the same structure as their scenario in the
sense that a potential whistleblower discovers a supervisor’s wrongdoing. However, the
theoretical framework of the present study, including the variables and causal relationships it
uses, is different from theirs.
46. See, e.g., GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT, WHY WHISTLEBLOWERS WAIT:
RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE THE DODD-FRANK LAW’S SEC WHISTLEBLOWER AWARDS
PROGRAM 10 (2016), https://www.whistleblower.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/GAP _Re
port_Why_Whistleblowers_Wait.pdf [https://perma.cc/@rQA-9YY6] (reporting that more
than 20% of whistleblowers experienced retaliation); ALL PARTY PARLIAMENTARY GRP.,
supra note 10, at 20 (reporting that 78% of whistleblowers experienced retaliation).
47. Regarding internal reporting, the SOX Act requires public companies to establish an
internal reporting system in which employees can submit confidential and anonymous reports
regarding questionable accounting or auditing matters (15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m) (2018)).
However, the effectiveness of internal reporting systems significantly varies depending on the
company; see, e.g., Stephen R. Stubben & Kyle T. Welch, Evidence on the Use and Efficacy
of Internal Whistleblowing Systems (2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3273589 [https://perm
a.cc/9KZH-52M9]. As for external reporting, the SEC has a statutory obligation to maintain
whistleblowers’ confidentiality under the SEC’s whistleblower reward program (15 U.S.C. §
78u-6(h)(2) (2018)).
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analyzed past SEC enforcement cases and made plausible settings by
choosing the appropriate amount for the monetary award, the industry, job
titles of the characters, stock prices, the degree of decline in stock prices, and
so on.
D. Dependent Variables: Internal and External Whistleblowing
Intentions
After the scenario, the participants were asked to indicate how likely
they would be to choose the following actions: internal whistleblowing,
external whistleblowing, keeping silent on the issue, leaving the company,
and other actions that they freely specified. A 7-point Likert scale was used
to rate their likelihood on each action from 1 (extremely unlikely) to 7
(extremely likely). Only the participants’ answers regarding internal and
external whistleblowing were used for the analysis.
E. Independent Variables
1. Moral Intensity
To have the participants evaluate the degree of immorality of the
financial misstatement, the following information was described in the
questionnaire:
As a result of the false financial disclosure, the company’s share
price will be inflated from $50 to $100, and the market value of
the company is likely to increase from $500 million to $1 billion.
Investors may buy at an inflated price and lose money if the truth
comes out while they hold the stock. On the other hand, an
investor who sells at an inflated price will make money that he
would otherwise not make. It should be noted that after the
revelation of a false financial disclosure, the company’s profits
might decrease, or the company could go bankrupt due to the
scandal. In these cases, the employees of the company might
receive fewer wages or, in the worst-case scenario, lose their jobs.
After reading this description, the participants were asked to rate their
agreement with the following six items using a 7-point Likert scale ranging
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). These six items were made
based on prior literature, as follows:
48
48. See Jones, supra note 35 (arguing that moral intensity has six components: magnitude
of consequences, social consensus, probability of effect, temporal immediacy, proximity, and
concentration of effect, which correspond to items (1) to (6), respectively). See Anusorn
Singhapakdi, Scott J. Vitell & Kenneth L. Kraft, Moral Intensity and Ethical Decision-
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(1)The overall harm to society (if any) as a result of the
supervisor’s actions would be very small.
(2)Most people would agree that the supervisor’s actions are
wrong.
(3)There is a very small likelihood that the supervisor’s actions
will actually cause any harm to society.
(4)The supervisor’s actions will not cause any harm to society in
the immediate future.
(5)The harmful effects (if any) of the supervisor’s actions will
affect people who are close to you.
(6)The supervisor’s actions will harm very few people (if any).
Because items (1), (3), (4), and (6) are phrased so that a low score means
a high degree of moral intensity, the responses to these items were reverse-
scored to be consistent with the other items, in which a high score means a
high degree of moral intensity. The reliability of these six items was tested
by Cronbach’s alpha. It assesses how consistently a set of items measures
the same characteristic, and a score of more than 0.7 is acceptable. The
Cronbach’s alpha for the six items was 0.791, and thus, these items were
acceptable for analysis. Given these steps, moral intensity was measured by
the mean score of the six items.
2. Organizational Commitment
Unlike moral intensity, organizational commitment is not an issue-
contingent concept, and thus, it was measured before the scenario was
presented to the participants. At the beginning of the questionnaire, the
participants were first asked to rate their agreement with the 15 items using
a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly
agree). Some examples of these items are “I am willing to put in a great deal
of effort beyond that normally expected in order to help this organization be
successful” and “I really care about the fate of this organization.”
49
These
15 items were adopted from prior literature and are included in the
Appendix.
50
Some items of organizational commitment were reverse-scored
Making of Marketing Professionals, 36 J. BUS. RES. 245 (1996) (showing that the six
components of moral intensity were correlated with the degree of ethical perception and
intention); Joan M. McMahon & Robert J. Harvey, An Analysis of the Factor Structure of
Jones’ Moral Intensity Construct, 64 J. BUS. ETHICS 381 (2006) (analyzing the
appropriateness of the six components of moral intensity).
49. Richard T. Mowday & Richard M. Steers, The Measurement of Organizational
Commitment, 14 J. VOCATIONALBEHAV. 224, 228 (1979).
50. Id.
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so that a high score shows a high degree of organizational commitment,
which is intuitive. Cronbach’s alpha for the 15 items was 0.940, and thus,
these items were acceptable for analysis. Given these steps, organizational
commitment was measured by the mean score of the 15 items.
3. Fear of Retaliation
After the scenario, the participants were asked to rate the importance of
the following four items in the decisions of whether to report internally and
whether to report externally. They used a 7-point Likert scale ranging from
1 (very unimportant) to 7 (very important).
(1) the likelihood of retaliation by interference with your career
promotion.
(2) the severity of retaliation by interference with your career
promotion.
(3) how quickly you will be able to find a job in another company
as a backup plan for the risk of possible retaliation from the
supervisor.
(4) how much your work conditions, such as salary, will change in
future jobs in other companies to which you might transfer when
you suffer retaliation from the supervisor.
The Cronbach’s alpha for the eight items (the above four items for each
case of internal and external whistleblowing) was 0.912, and thus, these
items were acceptable for analysis. The fear of retaliation was measured by
the mean score of these eight items.
4. Reward-Driven Motivation
After the scenario, the participants were asked to rate the importance of
the following two items in a decision whether to report externally. They used
a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (very unimportant) to 7 (very
important).
(1)the amount of an award you might receive.
(2)the probability of receiving an award.
The reliability of these two items was tested by the Spearman-Brown
coefficient, which is a more appropriate test for two items, and the coefficient
was 0.945. Thus, the two items were acceptable for analysis. Reward-driven
motivation was measured by the mean score of these two items.
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IV. RESULTS
This Part reports the results of the path analysis. The author usedMplus
Version 7.4, which is a statistical software.
A. Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 reports the means, standard deviations (SD), and correlations
of the variables used in the path analysis. For internal and external
whistleblowing intentions, the scale used was as follows: 1 (extremely
unlikely), 2 (moderately unlikely), 3 (slightly unlikely), 4 (neither likely nor
unlikely), 5 (slightly likely), 6 (moderately likely), and 7 (extremely likely).
Because the mean score of internal whistleblowing intention was 4.065, the
participants’ average answer was that they were neither likely nor unlikely
to report internally. By contrast, the mean score of external whistleblowing
intention was 5.11, and thus, the participants’ average answer was that they
were slightly likely to report externally.
For moral intensity and organizational commitment, the scale used was
as follows: 1 (strongly disagree), 2 (disagree), 3 (somewhat disagree), 4
(neither agree nor disagree), 5 (somewhat agree), 6 (agree), and 7 (strongly
agree). As explained, each variable was measured by the mean score of
multiple items; therefore, the potential scale of each variable ranged from 1
to 7. Because the mean scores of moral intensity and organizational
commitment were 4.968 and 4.548, respectively, the participants’ average
moral intensity and organizational commitment were slightly higher than the
midpoint of 4.
For the fear of retaliation and reward-driven motivation, the scale used
was as follows: 1 (very unimportant), 2 (unimportant), 3 (somewhat
unimportant), 4 (neither unimportant or important), 5 (somewhat important),
6 (important), and 7 (very important). As explained, each variable was
measured by the mean score of multiple items; therefore, the potential scale
of each variable ranged from 1 to 7. Because the mean scores of the fear of
retaliation and reward-driven motivation were 5.3 and 4.985, respectively,
the participants’ average answers showed that these two factors were
somewhat important in their reporting decision.
Table 3 reports the crosstabulation of internal and external
whistleblowing intentions. The proportion of participants whose likelihood
of internal whistleblowing was 5 (slightly likely) or higher was 51%
(102/200), and 81% of those participants (83/102) answered that their
likelihood of external whistleblowing was also 5 (slightly likely) or higher.
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Table 2: Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlation Analysis (N =
200)
Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5
1 IW 4.065 1.831
2 EW 5.110 1.646 0.144
3 MI 4.968 .978 0.043 0.302
4 OC 4.548 1.285 0.215 0.123 0.029
5 FR 5.300 1.141 -0.228 -0.046 0.042 0.101
6 RM 4.985 1.737 -0.149 0.253 0.090 0.103 0.124
Note: IW = internal whistleblowing intention; EW = external
whistleblowing intention; MI = moral intensity; OC = organizational
commitment; FR = fear of retaliation; RM = reward-driven motivation.
Table 3: Crosstabulation of Internal and External Whistleblowing
Intentions
EW
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Total
IW 1 6 0 1 2 3 4 10 26
2 1 7 3 1 4 5 2 23
3 0 0 3 2 8 8 6 27
4 0 0 1 6 9 4 2 22
5 0 2 5 4 13 15 16 55
6 0 1 2 1 13 7 8 32
7 1 2 1 0 5 5 1 15
Total 8 12 16 16 55 48 45 200
Note: See the note of Table 2 for the notation of the variables.
B. Path Analysis
Table 4 reports the unstandardized and standardized path coefficients,
and Figure 2 reports the output path diagram with the standardized path
coefficients. In Table 4, the unstandardized coefficients (B), standard errors
(S.E.), and standardized coefficients (β) of the independent variables are
reported for each dependent variable—internal and external whistleblowing
intentions.
51
Unstandardized coefficients show that if an independent
variable increases by one point, howmuch a dependent variable changes. By
51. Since the model is saturated, fit indices are not reported.
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contrast, standardized coefficients show that if an independent variable
increases by one standard deviation, howmuch a dependent variable changes
in standard deviation units. Standardized coefficients are used to compare
the relative impacts of independent variables. Conventionally, the
standardized coefficients of 0.1, 0.3, and 0.5 represent small, medium, and
large effect sizes respectively: a medium effect size is “likely to be apparent
to the naked eye of a careful observer”; a small effect size is “noticeably
smaller yet not trivial”; a large effect size is “the same distance above
medium as small is below it.”
52
Moreover, Table 4 reports the R-squared
values for each dependent variable. R-squared measures the proportion of
variance of a dependent variable that is explained by independent variables.
Conventionally, the R-squared values of 0.02, 0.13, and 0.26 represent small,
medium, and large effect sizes, respectively.
For internal whistleblowing intention, the signs of the coefficients of
the independent variables were consistent with theoretical predictions. The
standardized coefficients indicate that organizational commitment and the
fear of retaliation were the main causes behind internal whistleblowing
intention. Both factors had small-to-medium effects, but one was a positive
effect, and the other was a negative one. In the model, if organizational
commitment increases by one standard deviation, internal whistleblowing
intention increases by 0.253 standard deviation. By contrast, if the fear of
retaliation increases by one standard deviation, internal whistleblowing
intention decreases by 0.238 standard deviation. Reward-driven motivation
had a coefficient of -0.151, and hence, it had a small impact. Moral intensity
had a coefficient of 0.059, and thus, it had a very small impact. The impacts
of the independent variables, except for moral intensity, were statistically
significant. Because the R-squared value was 0.134, 13% of the variance of
internal whistleblowing intention can be explained by the independent
variables, which can be interpreted as a medium effect size. From the results
above, hypotheses H3, H5, and H7 were not rejected, but H1 was rejected.
For external whistleblowing intention, except for organizational
commitment, the signs of the coefficients of the independent variables were
consistent with the theoretical predictions. The standardized coefficients
indicate that moral intensity and reward-driven motivation were the main
causes of external whistleblowing intention. Moral intensity had a
coefficient of 0.283, and hence, it had a medium impact. Reward-driven
motivation had a coefficient of 0.229, and thus, it had a small-to-medium
effect. Organizational commitment and the fear of retaliation had
coefficients of 0.101 and -0.096, respectively, both of which are small effect
52. Jacob Cohen, Statistical Power Analysis, 1 CURRENTDIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 98,
99 (1992).
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sizes. The impacts of moral intensity and reward-driven motivation were
statistically significant, but those of organizational commitment and the fear
of retaliation were not. The R-squared value was 0.160, and thus 16% of the
variance of external whistleblowing intention can be explained by the
independent variables, which can be interpreted as a medium effect size.
From the results above, hypotheses H2 and H8 were not rejected, but H4 and
H6 were rejected.
Table 4: Unstandardized and Standardized Path Coefficients
IW EW
B S.E. β B S.E. β
MI 0.111 0.141 0.059 0.476** 0.145 0.283
OC 0.361** 0.097 0.253 0.129 0.092 0.101
FR -0.382** 0.106 -0.238 -0.139 0.102 -0.096
RM -0.159* 0.073 -0.151 0.217** 0.069 0.229
R
2
0.134 0.160
Note: B = unstandardized coefficient; β = standardized coefficient; *p
< .05; **p < .01. See the note of Table 2 for the notation of the variables.
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driven motivation had a positive and small-to-medium effect.
Although a majority of the hypotheses were not rejected, some
hypotheses were rejected. Regarding internal whistleblowing intention,
moral intensity had a very small effect on it, and the effect was not
statistically significant. This may be because most participants thought that
the internal reporting channel was not effective in solving the issue. If the
individuals thought that the misstatement was morally unacceptable, as long
as the company was likely to take actions to solve the issue with all other
conditions held constant, this would lead to an increase in internal
whistleblowing intention. Therefore, the negligible impact of moral
intensity on internal whistleblowing intention may reflect the participants’
perception of the ineffectiveness of the internal whistleblowing channel.
Indeed, such a view is consistent with the fact that organizational
commitment had a positive effect on internal whistleblowing intention. The
participants may have perceived internal reporting as their job duty, not a
solution to ethical issues.
As for external whistleblowing intention, contrary to the theoretical
prediction, organizational commitment had a positive impact on it, and the
effect was not statistically significant. This may be because people in the
United States perceive external whistleblowing as a prosocial behavior, not
a betrayal of organizations. Thus, the result may change in other societies
that have different attitudes toward external whistleblowing. Moreover, the
fear of retaliation did not have a statistically significant effect. This was
probably affected by the fact that the probability of leaking of personal
information and subsequent retaliation by the supervisor was assumed to be
higher in the case of internal reporting (50%) than in the case of external
reporting (25%). If this assumption were to change, the result would change.
One caveat in interpreting the results is that the research of this Article
did not explore how monetary rewards affect employees’ internal reporting.
The effects of monetary rewards on internal reporting have been a hot issue
in many jurisdictions because these rewards may discourage employees’
internal reporting, thus undermining corporate governance. Although the
results suggested a small and negative impact of reward-driven motivation
on internal whistleblowing intention, this does not mean that the monetary
rewards discouraged participants’ internal whistleblowing intention; this
simply means that if a participant valued monetary rewards to a greater
extent than others, this characteristic tended to have a negative impact on the
choice of internal whistleblowing under a situation in which monetary
rewards were available. The results show nothing about the case where
rewards were not available. To find the effects of monetary rewards on
internal reporting, cases with and without monetary rewards should be
compared.
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Another caveat is that people’s whistleblowing intention may differ
from their actual whistleblowing behavior.
53
The results of this Article
should be evaluated along with the data of actual whistleblowing cases.
Because the data of whistleblowing cases is very limited, this type of study
using hypothetical scenarios can complement the findings from actual cases.
B. Limitations of the Study
As explained in Section III.A, a path analysis was used to estimate the
relative strengths of the causal relationships by assuming that the causal
relationships were correctly specified in the model. Although a majority of
the hypotheses were not rejected, this does not mean that the causal
relationships were proved. Prior literature has accumulated evidence that
supports and rejects the causal relationships focused on in this Article, and
the results of this Article make some causal relationships more plausible and
others less so. To establish a firm theory, further empirical studies are
necessary.
It is well-known that the type of crime at issue affects people’s
whistleblowing behavior. Also, other factors, such as the expected amount
of monetary rewards and the degree of retaliation, would affect the strengths
of the causal relationships in whistleblowing. Therefore, future research
should estimate the strengths of causal relationships in different situational
settings and compare their results with the results from this Article. This
type of comparison has not yet been fully made because of a lack of
established benchmark cases. This Article provides such a benchmark for
future research to evaluate the relative impacts of factors affecting
whistleblowing under a whistleblower reward program. Because there were
no good comparable estimates, the author used conventional statistical
criteria for the effect sizes, which are convenient but rough standards.
C. Policy Implications
Regarding internal whistleblowing, U.S. companies need to establish
effective internal governance systems if they wish to promote employees’
internal reports. The two main factors affecting internal whistleblowing
intention were organizational commitment and the fear of retaliation.
Although organizational commitment had a positive impact, the fear of
retaliation had a negative impact on internal whistleblowing intention.
Because these effects had almost the same size, employees’ willingness to
report internally based on organizational commitment may be offset by the
53. Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, supra note 39, at 285–88.
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fear of retaliation. Effective internal governance systems with strong
protections for whistleblowers would lower the fear of retaliation.
Moreover, if the recipients of internal reports, such as companies’ internal
compliance departments, are more likely to take timely actions to prevent
crimes, employees’ perceptions of the effectiveness of the internal channel
would improve. If this is achieved, more employees would report internally
based on their moral intensity, not just based on their organizational
commitment. Since the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, U.S.
companies have tried to establish effective internal reporting and compliance
systems, but the results of this Article appear to show that employees
perceive the effectiveness of these systems as insufficient.
As for external whistleblowing, the results seem to show that the SEC
has successfully won trust from workers in the United States. Moral
intensity was one of the main factors affecting external whistleblowing
intention. This may mean that people thought that the external channel was
a possible solution to ethical issues. Since the establishment of the SEC
whistleblower award program, the number of whistleblowing tips that the
SEC receives has increased. To maintain trust from potential
whistleblowers, the SEC should allocate enough resources to the claims
review process so that whistleblowers are appropriately rewarded.
Furthermore, the SEC should continue to take enforcement actions against
companies and individuals who fail to comply with the anti-retaliation
provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act. Although the fear of retaliation had a
small and statistically insignificant effect on external whistleblowing
intention, this may be because the risk of retaliation was assumed to be low
in external whistleblowing.
This Article focused on the SEC whistleblower award program in the
United States, but the policy implications above would be helpful for other
jurisdictions that already have whistleblower reward programs or are
contemplating the introduction of such programs. A common objection
against whistleblower reward programs is that whistleblowing has been a
taboo in many countries, and the idea of encouraging such behavior conflicts
with social norms or the culture in those countries. However, social norms
or the culture itself may be influenced by legal systems. If whistleblower
reward programs are introduced and corporate crimes are successfully
deterred by these programs, people may start to perceive whistleblowing as
a prosocial behavior. The interaction between legal systems and social
norms should be considered in the debate of whistleblower rewards.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
This Article has explored the relative impacts of the factors affecting
employees’ whistleblowing decisions. The SEC whistleblower award
program, which has expanded recently, was chosen as the research subject.
The author conducted a questionnaire survey of U.S. employees using a
securities violation scenario. Based on the survey data, a path analysis was
conducted to estimate the relative strength of the determinants of internal and
external whistleblowing intentions. The results of the path analysis showed
that given certain assumptions of the scenario, there were two main factors
affecting internal whistleblowing intention: organizational commitment had
a positive impact, and the fear of retaliation had a negative impact. In
comparison, there were also two main factors affecting external
whistleblowing intention: moral intensity and reward-driven motivation,
both of which had positive impacts. The effect sizes of these impacts on
internal and external whistleblowing intentions fell within the small-to-
medium range according to conventional statistical criteria. This Article
provided a simple framework and benchmark estimates for future research.
Surveys using different scenarios will advance our understanding of
whistleblowers’ decisions, which will lead to better designs of whistleblower
reward programs and protection laws.
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APPENDIX
This Appendix includes the scenario and questionnaire items used in
the survey. Some measurement items of whistleblowing intentions were not
used in the analysis. Those items were used to check the participants’
attention and for informational purposes.
Measurement Items of Organizational Commitment
54
Please indicate the strength of your agreement or disagreement with
each of the following statements regarding the organization for which you
are currently working or the last organization for which you worked. Please
answer based on a 7-point scale that ranges from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7
(strongly agree).
OC-1: I am willing to put in a great deal of effort beyond that normally
expected in order to help this organization to be successful.
OC-2: I talk up this organization to my friends as a great organization to
work for.
OC-3: I feel very little loyalty to this organization.
OC-4: I would accept almost any type of job assignment in order to keep
working for this organization.
OC-5: I find that my values and the organization’s values are very
similar.
OC-6: I am proud to tell others I am part of this organization.
OC-7: I could just as well be working for a different organization as long
as the type of work there was similar.
OC-8: This organization really inspires the best in me in the way of job
performance.
OC-9: It would take very little change in my present circumstances to
cause me to leave this organization.
OC-10: I am extremely glad that I chose this organization to work for
over others I was considering at the time.
OC-11: There is not too much to be gained by sticking with this
organization indefinitely.
OC-12: Often I find it difficult to agree with this organization’s policies
on important matters relating to its employees.
OC-13: I really care about the fate of this organization.
OC-14: For me, this is the best of all possible organizations for which to
54. Richard T. Mowday & Richard M. Steers, The Measurement of Organizational
Commitment, 14 J. VOCATIONALBEHAV. 224, 228 (1979).
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work.
OC-15: Deciding to work for this organization was a definite mistake on
my part.
Whistleblowing Scenario
You are an assistant manager in the general accounting department of a
company selling information technology services. The company has always
complied with accounting standards. Mr. Smith is a new manager who is the
head of the general accounting department. Most colleagues praise his
leadership. However, Mr. Smith has begun to manipulate the company’s
financial documents to overstate its profits because the company’s profits
have dropped dramatically this year. Therefore, the manipulated financial
documents do not reflect the actual profits.
When you raise concerns about this point with Mr. Smith, he answers
that this manipulation is one-time-only, and the company will soon regain its
profitability as a result of a new product it will soon announce. He argues
that the firm’s financial condition will become consistent with this year’s
financial statements in the next year or two. You have no personal feelings
of like or dislike toward Mr. Smith and indeed view him as a competent
manager.
Yet, you think that investors will be deceived by the company’s
misstatement and that the company’s share price will be inflated as a result
of the false financial disclosure. You have repeatedly raised these concerns
with Mr. Smith, but he has not changed his thinking on this matter. Thus,
you are thinking about the following options:
(1) Bringing this matter to a whistleblower hotline inside the
company [Note:Whistleblowing is the disclosure by organization
members of illegal, immoral, or illegitimate practices under the
control of their employers to persons or organizations that may
be able to effect action. A whistleblower hotline inside the
company is one of the company’s departments. It accepts reports
from whistleblowers in the company and is supposed to take any
actions to solve problems reported by the whistleblowers.]
(2) Bringing this matter to the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) whistleblower award program [Note:
Whistleblowers can receive an award if they come forward with
high-quality original information that leads to a Commission
enforcement action in which over $1,000,000 in sanctions is
ordered. Whistleblower awards range from 10% to 30% of the
money collected. The SEC is an agency of the U.S. federal
government and is responsible for enforcing the federal securities
laws. There is no guarantee that the SEC will bring an
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enforcement action or, if it does, that an award will be obtained.]
(3) Keeping silent on this matter
(4) Leaving the company [Note: You are in no personal danger of
liability as a result of what Mr. Smith has done if you keep silent
on this matter.]
(5) Other possible action(s)
If you blow the whistle to a whistleblower hotline inside the company
or to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) whistleblower
award program, your personal information is supposed to be kept
confidential. However, there is the possibility that, despite the laws that
protect you, your personal information might be leaked, andMr. Smith might
retaliate by interfering with your career promotion. The probability of the
leak of personal information and retaliation by Mr. Smith is 50% in the case
where you blow the whistle to the whistleblower hotline inside the company
and 25% in the case where you blow the whistle to the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) whistleblower award program.
If you blow the whistle to the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) whistleblower award program, there is the possibility
that you could receive $10 million. Whistleblowers can only receive an
award if they come forward with high-quality original information, and you
are thinking that the probability of receiving the award is 10% in this case.
[Note: If you blow the whistle to a whistleblower hotline inside the company,
you cannot receive any monetary payments.]
Measurement Items of Moral Intensity
As a result of the false financial disclosure, the company’s share price
will be inflated from $50 to $100, and the market value of the company is
likely to increase from $500 million to $1 billion. Investors may buy at an
inflated price and lose money if the truth comes out while they hold the stock.
On the other hand, an investor who sells at an inflated price will make money
that he would otherwise not make. It should be noted that after the revelation
of a false financial disclosure, the company’s profits might decrease or the
company could go bankrupt due to the scandal. In these cases, the employees
of the company might receive fewer wages or, in the worst-case scenario,
lose their jobs.
Please indicate the strength of your agreement or disagreement with
each of the following statements based on a 7-point scale that ranges from 1
(strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).
MI-1: The overall harm to society (if any) as a result of Mr.
Smith’s actions would be very small.
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MI-2: Most people would agree that Mr. Smith’s actions are
wrong.
MI-3: There is a very small likelihood that Mr. Smith’s actions
will actually cause any harm to society.
MI-4: Mr. Smith’s actions will not cause any harm to society in
the immediate future.
MI-5: The harmful effects (if any) of Mr. Smith’s actions will
affect people who are close to you.
MI-6: Mr. Smith’s actions will harm very few people (if any).
Measurement Items of Whistleblowing Intentions
Please rate each of the actions mentioned below based on the following
factors:
WI-1: You will blow the whistle to a hotline inside the company.
How likely is it that you will choose this action?
7-point scale that ranges from 1 (extremely unlikely) to 7 (extremely
likely)
How appropriate would this action be?
7-point scale that ranges from 1 (extremely inappropriate) to 7
(extremely appropriate)
How effective would this action be?
7-point scale that ranges from 1 (extremely ineffective) to 7 (extremely
effective)
WI-2: You will blow the whistle to the SEC whistleblower award
program.
WI-3: You will keep silent.
WI-4: You will choose to leave the company.
WI-5: You will choose another action. Please specify that action.
[ ]
Please rank each of the above actions from best to worst.
[ ] You will blow the whistle to a hotline inside the company.
[ ] You will blow the whistle to the SEC whistleblower award
program.
[ ] You will keep silent.
[ ] You will choose to leave the company.
[ ] You will choose another action.
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Measurement Items of Fear of Retaliation and Reward-Driven
Motivation
Based on this scenario, if you are thinking about blowing the whistle to
a hotline inside the company, how important are each of the following
considerations? (1: very unimportant to 7: very important)
EI-1: the likelihood of retaliation by interference with your career
promotion.
EI-2:the severity of retaliation by interference with your career
promotion.
EI-3: how quickly you will be able to find a job in another
company as a backup plan for the risk of possible retaliation from
Mr. Smith.
EI-4: how much your work conditions, such as salary, will change
in future jobs in other companies to which youmight transfer when
you suffer retaliation from Mr. Smith.
Based on this scenario, if you are thinking about blowing the whistle to
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) whistleblower award
program, how important are each of the following considerations? (1: very
unimportant to 7: very important)
EE-1: the likelihood of retaliation by interference with your career
promotion.
EE-2: the severity of retaliation by interference with your career
promotion.
EE-3: how quickly you will be able to find a job in another
company as a backup plan for the risk of possible retaliation from
Mr. Smith.
EE-4: howmuch your work conditions, such as salary, will change
in future jobs in other companies to which youmight transfer when
you suffer retaliation from Mr. Smith.
EE-5: the amount of an award you might receive.
EE-6: the probability of receiving an award.
Demographic Questions
DQ-1: What is your gender?
Woman
Man
DQ-2: What is your age? _________
DQ-3: What is the highest grade or year of school that you have
completed?
Less than high school
2020] RELATIVE IMPACTS OFMONETARY ANDNON-MONETARY 625
High school diploma
Some college/No degree
Associate’s Degree
Bachelor’s Degree
Master’s Degree
Doctoral Degree
Professional degree
DQ-4: Which employment status best describes you?
Employed for wages
Self-employed
Unemployed for more than 1 year
Unemployed for less than 1 year
Homemaker
Student
Retired
Unable to work
DQ-5: If you are currently employed for wages, then please
describe your work.
Employee of a publicly listed corporation
Employee of a non-publicly listed corporation
Local government employee (e.g., city or county)
State government employee
Federal government employee
Other
DQ-6: If you are not currently an employee of a publicly listed
corporation, then do you have any experience with working in a
publicly listed corporation as an employee?
Yes
No
DQ-7: What is your total household income?
Less than $30,000
$30,000–$39,999
$40,000–$49,999
$50,000–$59,999
$60,000–$69,999
$70,000–$79,999
$80,000–$89,999
$90,000–$99,999
$100,000–$149,999
$150,000 or more
DQ-8: Which status best describes you?
Married
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Divorced
Widowed
Separated
Never been married
Partner in an unmarried couple
DQ-9: Do you have children?
Yes
No
DQ-10: Have you or anyone who you know engaged in
whistleblowing in the past—that is, reported illegal, immoral, or
illegitimate practices under the control of employers to persons or
organizations possibly able to effect corrective action?
Yes
No
